

## Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 056004

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT USNATO 02118 ACTION SECSTATE 01 MAR 78

QUOTE

S E C R E T USNATO 02118

NODIS

NSC FOR AARON/PM FOR GELB

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: NATO, PARM, MNUC, SALT  
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 24 NAC CONSULTATION: AMBASSADOR WARNKE'S  
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

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1. TEXT FOLLOWS OF AMBASSADOR WARNKE'S INTRODUCTORY  
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REMARKS TO NAC ON FEBRUARY 24.

2. BEGIN TEXT: I. NAC AS FOCUS FOR SALT CONSULTATIONS.

THIS IS THE SEVENTH MEETING THAT AMBASSADOR EARLE AND I  
HAVE HAD WITH THE COUNCIL SINCE THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS  
RESUMED IN GENEVA IN MAY 1977. IN ADDITION, AS YOU  
KNOW, US EXPERTS ON SALT HAVE MET WITH THE COUNCIL ON  
SEVERAL OTHER OCCASIONS.

WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING THE COUNCIL UP-TO-

DATE AGAIN ON OUR EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CONSULT ON THE OUTSTANDING SALT ISSUES. I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THE SECRETARY GENERAL REFER TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT OF JANUARY 6. I KNOW HE WOULD LIKE ME TO REAFFIRM THAT STATEMENT:

- "AS SALT TWO PROCEEDS TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT, WHICH
- WE HOPE WILL COME SOON, WE WILL INTENSIFY OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL OF YOU, RECOGNIZING THAT THE COUNCIL IS THE FOCUS OF OUR DELIBERATIONS. AS WE MOVE BEYOND SALT TWO, WE WILL UNDERTAKE BROAD DISCUSSIONS HERE ON ALL ALLIED SECURITY ISSUES."

I'M SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE FRUITS OF OUR CONSULTATIONS HERE CAN ONLY BE ASSESSED ON THE BASIS OF OUR ACTUAL DISCUSSIONS AND EXCHANGES OF VIEW, NOT ON THE BASIS OF INADEQUATELY INFORMED PRESS REPORTS. I BELIEVE THAT THE RESULTS OF THESE CONSULTATIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SALT ISSUES AND HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES. THIS I SUBMIT IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED IN AN ALLIANCE WHERE VITAL INTERESTS ARE KNOWN TO BE SHARED AND THE PROCESS CAN ONLY  
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BECOME MORE IMPORTANT TO MAKE SURE THAT, AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT, THE EMERGING AND FUTURE SALT AGREEMENTS WILL ENHANCE OUR COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS.

## II. OUTLINE OF DISCUSSIONS.

IN MY PART OF TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS, I WILL REVIEW FIRST WHAT WE SEE AS THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES AND BENEFITS OF SALT, AND THE WAY IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE PAST ALMOST 10 MONTHS HAVE BROUGHT US CLOSE TO THOSE OBJECTIVES. AMBASSADOR EARLE WILL THEN PROVIDE AN UPDATE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GENEVA TALKS SINCE WE LAST MET WITH THE COUNCIL IN EARLY DECEMBER. WE WILL, OF COURSE, WELCOME ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS THAT COUNCIL MEMBERS MAY HAVE ON THESE SUBJECTS.

## III. SALT OBJECTIVES.

--OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IS TO ENHANCE OUR SHARED VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS THROUGH EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS IN SALT.

--SALT DOES NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR SOUND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE POLICY, BUT RATHER COMPLEMENTS IT AND ENHANCES OUR ABILITY TO IMPROVE IT WHEREVER REQUIRED, SUCH AS IN THE CONVENTIONAL AREA.

--WE SEEK QUANTITATIVE REDUCTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET FORCES, IN AN AGREEMENT

WHICH ASSURES AN ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE WHILE PROTECTING OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A FULLY SUFFICIENT DEFENSE POSTURE.

--WE SEEK AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR COMMON DEFENSE STRATEGY. AN AGREEMENT WHICH FAILED TO MEET THIS TEST WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES ITS UNIQUE ROLE IN THE COL-  
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LECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE ALLIANCE. THE SALT AGREEMENT WE ARE NEGOTIATING WILL NOT IMPAIR OUR OPTIONS TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATO TRIAD AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

--FUNDAMENTALLY, WE SEEK THE BEST AGREEMENT WE CAN ACHIEVE, ONE THAT WILL BE COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TO REALIZE THAT WE CANNOT SOLVE EVERY CONCEIVABLE PROBLEM IN ONE SALT TREATY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROBLEMS WHICH WILL NOT BE FULLY RESOLVED BY A SALT TWO AGREEMENT WOULD CERTAINLY REMAIN IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. INDEED, THESE PROBLEMS WOULD BE MORE ACUTE BECAUSE THE MOMENTUM OF DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNCONSTRAINED.

--WE DO NOT SEEK AN AGREEMENT BASED ON TRUST. RATHER, WE ARE INSISTING ON ADEQUATE VERIFIABILITY AND RECOGNIZE THAT EACH SIDE CAN BE "TRUSTED" ONLY TO PURSUE AGREEMENT WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS SECURITY INTERESTS. THE VIABILITY OF ANY AGREEMENT OBVIOUSLY IS ENHANCED WHEN EACH SIDE HAS A SUBSTANTIAL VESTED INTEREST IN ITS DURABILITY.

#### IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF OBJECTIVES.

--THE THREE-PART NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK AGREED LAST MAY BETWEEN SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WILL PERMIT US TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES:

(A) THE LONG-TERM TREATY WILL ESTABLISH EQUAL AGGREGATES IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS, IN CONTRAST TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LEVELS. IT WILL NOT CONSTRAIN U.S. SYSTEMS WHICH ARE FORWARD DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS,  
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NOR WILL IT GIVE ANY COMPENSATION TO THE SOVIETS FOR THE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF OUR ALLIES.

(B) THE SHORTER-TERM PROTOCOL WILL DEAL WITH SOME ISSUES ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS, WHILE KEEPING ALL OPTIONS SUCH

AS THOSE FOR CRUISE MISSILES, OPEN FOR THEIR LONGER-TERM RESOLUTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN ANY DIRECTION. MATTERS SUCH AS THESE ARE UNDER STUDY IN NATO TASK FORCE 10 WHICH WILL PROVIDE BASIS FOR ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON TNF. THE PROTOCOL WILL PROVIDE TIME FOR CONTINUED ASSESSMENT OF THESE QUESTIONS IN AN OVERALL SECURITY CONTEXT, INCLUDING THE FLEXIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF CERTAIN WEAPONS SYSTEMS, THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF FUTURE SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS, AND THE RELATION OF THESE SYSTEMS TO ALLIANCE DEFENSE STRATEGY AS WELL AS TO CURRENT AND FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

(C) THE PRINCIPLES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ARE INTENDED TO INDICATE OUR OVERALL DIRECTION FOR SALT THREE IN A WAY WHICH PRESERVES OUR NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE WHILE FOCUSING ON THOSE MAJOR AREAS WHERE WE SEEK FURTHER LIMITATIONS.

--THE NEGOTIATIONS IN WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN GENEVA HAVE MOVED US APPRECIABLY CLOSER TO AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WHICH STILL REMAIN.

V. STATUS OF "SECONDARY ISSUES" ASSIGNED TO THE DELEGATIONS IN MAY 1977.

AS YOU WILL RECALL, WHEN THE SALT DELEGATIONS RESUMED THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA LAST MAY, THEY HAD AN AGENDA OF FOUR SO-CALLED "SECONDARY ISSUES." THREE OF THESE ISSUES WERE OF PRINCIPAL CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES -- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RULES ON MIRV VERIFICATION, A BAN  
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ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DATA BASE. ON THESE THREE ISSUES, LANGUAGE HAS NOW BEEN AGREED UPON AND THE ISSUES ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING RESOLVED ESSENTIALLY ON OUR TERMS. AMBASSADOR EARLE WILL DISCUSS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GREATER DETAIL. THE SOVIETS HAD A MAJOR INTEREST IN THE FOURTH ISSUE -- THAT IS, PROVISIONS ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER.

--AS YOU WILL RECALL, THE SOVIETS FOR SOME TWO YEARS HAD PROPOSED A STRINGENT NON-TRANSFER PROVISION SEPARATE FROM THEIR NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSAL. THE UNITED STATES LAST SUMMER COUNTERED WITH A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSAL WHICH WE DISCUSSED WITH THE COUNCIL ON JUNE 27, 1977 BEFORE TABLING IT. SINCE THEN, THE SOVIETS COMBINED THEIR TWO PROPOSALS INTO ONE PROVISION BUT WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE.

--MORE RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFIED THEIR PROPOSAL BY SUBSUMING NON-TRANSFER UNDER

THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CONCEPT AND BY DELETING EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE TRANSFER OF COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS AND BLUEPRINTS. THE REVISED SOVIET PROPOSAL READS AS FOLLOWS:

- "IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS
- OF THIS TREATY, EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO TAKE
- ACTIONS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE PROVISIONS OF THIS
- TREATY BEING WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENTED IN ANY MANNER,
- AMONG OTHER THINGS BY TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
- ARMS TO THIRD STATES OR ANY RECIPIENT WHATSOEVER,
- AS WELL AS BY ASSISTANCE IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT."

--WHILE THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL IS A SIGNIFICANT MODIFICATION, IT COULD STILL BE READ TO SUGGEST THAT ANY TRANSFERS WOULD, IN AND OF THEMSELVES, CONSTITUTE CIRCUMVENTION. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IN ADDITION, THE CONTINUED SOVIET REFERENCE TO "WEAKENING" OF THE TREATY WOULD RAISE MAJOR DOUBTS AS TO THE MEANING OF THIS PROVISION.

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WITH THE COUNCIL WE ALSO DISCUSSED AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION FOR A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION TO BE USED AS A FALLBACK AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. IT READS:

--YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN OUR JUNE 27, 1977 DISCUSSION WITH THE COUNCIL WE ALSO DISCUSSED AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION FOR A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION TO BE USED AS A FALLBACK AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. IT READS:

- "IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS
- OF THIS TREATY, EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO CIRCUMVENT
- THE PROVISIONS OF THIS TREATY THROUGH ANY OTHER
- STATE OR STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER."

--WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE VIRTUE OF THE ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE IS THAT IT COUNTERS THE SOVIET PROPOSED REFERENCE TO NON-TRANSFER.

--WE HAVE CONTINUED TO WEIGH CAREFULLY THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF OUR NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE, AND WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE APPROACH WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY CLEARED WITH YOU WILL SERVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES. END TEXT.

3. OTHER REPORTS FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

4. ACTION: REQUEST DEPARTMENT PASS TEXT TO ALL NATO CAPITALS AND ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES. GLITMAN UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

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## Message Attributes

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